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REAL RESPECT: A REJECTION OF RICHARD MILLER’S 
PATRIOTIC BIAS IN TAX-FINANCED AID 
 
Gerbrand Hoogvliet 
Abstract    This paper analyzes Richard W. Miller's argument for 
favoring compatriots in the allocation of tax-financed aid. It argues 
that Miller‘s patriotic bias is derived via an incorrect framing of 
the problem. It furthermore contends that Miller‘s notion of equal 
respect is too uninformative to ground such a patriotic bias. A 
better definition of respect in terms of human rights is offered. This 
definition is more informative but fails to uphold the stringent bias 
Miller argues for. 
 
National borders occupy a curious position in political 
philosophy and ethics. Their existence and location is often the 
result of mere historical accident. Yet, despite this arbitrary nature, 
the nation states defined by these borders are often chosen as the 
primary actors in theories of international relations. Similarly in 
ethics, there is a tension between the fact that citizenship seems 
morally arbitrary, insofar as it is usually bestowed upon persons at 
birth, and on the other hand the moral obligations that participation 
in a particular society seem to give rise to. In the context of global 
poverty national borders take on another moral dimension since 
they often, as Michael Blake puts it, ―divide not simply one 
jurisdiction from another, but the rich from the poor as well‖1. 
                                                 
1
 Michael Blake, ―Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy‖, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 3 (2001), 257. 
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Given the grim facts of poverty in many parts of the world, the 
question of whether wealthier nations are morally allowed to favor 
their own citizens over foreigners in dire need becomes an 
important one. 
 Richard Miller, in his contribution to the anthology The 
Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, entitled ―Cosmopolitan 
Respect and Patriotic Concern‖, provides a universalist defense of 
such a favoritism. He argues that on the basis of the principle of 
equal respect for all persons we are in fact obligated to prioritize 
our compatriots when it comes to tax-financed aid. He argues that 
a violation of such a patriotic bias would entail disrespectful 
treatment of our fellow citizens and would lead to an excessive 
loss of social trust. Given that breaking the principle of equal 
respect is wrong, violation of the patriotic bias is also wrong. We 
are thus morally obligated to prioritize compatriots in the 
administration of such aid. 
 In this paper I will argue against the position put forward 
by Richard Miller. I will begin with an exposition of his argument. 
For the benefit of the reader I will also provide a brief explanation 
of concepts found in John Rawls‘s Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, that are important to a proper understanding of 
Miller‘s position. I will then provide my own critique, focusing 
firstly on what I hold to be an improper framing of the issue, 
followed by a more fundamental criticism of the notion of equal 
respect used by Miller. I will show his definition of equal respect 
to be uninformative and anemic and will proceed to redefine this 
concept in a more substantial way by appealing to the 
philosophical literature on human rights. 
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Miller 
 In his paper, Miller aims to provide ―a universalist 
justification of the patriotic bias in aid.‖2  Universalism here refers 
to a position similar to cosmopolitanism, which takes human 
beings as ‗the relevant unit of moral concern‘. It is mainly defined 
in contrast to what Miller calls particularism, which is a view 
maintained by philosophers such as David Miller and Michael 
Sandel, who ascribe intrinsic value to communities of persons such 
as nations. For particularists, the defense of patriotism is usually 
based on some notion that it benefits the community or the nation 
state. Since Richard Miller rejects a view of nations as intrinsically 
valuable he cannot make a similar claim. In fact, because he adopts 
the universalist view of all persons as having equal moral value, he 
commits himself to the use of universal principle that applies to all 
persons. This principle is that of equal respect. 
 In order to establish a patriotic bias, however, he first has to 
identify what such a bias consists of. He points out that the 
patriotic bias is really a combination of two biases: an attention 
bias and a budgetary bias. To establish the attention bias he has to 
prove that we are justified and indeed obligated to pay more 
attention to the needs of our compatriots than to the needs of 
foreigners. The budgetary bias is then the working out of this 
attention bias in terms of assigning aid and simply means that the 
majority of our tax-financed aid is indeed spent on compatriots. He 
recognizes that he has to establish the attention bias before he can 
claim the budgetary bias. 
                                                 
2
  Richard W. Miller, ―Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern,‖ in The 
Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, ed. Gillian Brock and Harry 
Brighouse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 127. 
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Equal Respect 
 In establishing the principle of equal respect, Miller makes 
an appropriate distinction between respect and concern. Whereas 
most of the literature conflates these two terms, he defines them 
separately. Concern, for Miller, applies to personal relationships 
such as between family members, friends etc and signifies a deep 
level of caring for the well being of others. I think Miller rightly 
restricts this type of sympathy to those who we are personally 
acquainted with. As an example, he states that although he owes 
equal respect to his daughter and the girl across the street, he is not 
required to have the same level of concern for the latter. I think this 
is a sensible distinction and it clarifies the task at hand: since 
concern covers all persons that we stand in a personal relationship 
to, the principle of respect is the one that will regulate our behavior 
to strangers domestically and abroad. 
 The equal respect that we owe to strangers has two main 
parameters: 
 
1) One avoids moral wrongness just in case one 
conforms to some set of rules for living by 
which one could express equal respect for all.
3
 
 
2) A choice is wrong just in case it violates every 
set of shared rules of conduct to which 
everyone could be freely and rationally 
committed without anyone‘s violating his or 
her own self-respect.
4
 
 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 132 
4
 Ibid. 
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The phrasing of these parameters is somewhat confusing, but in a 
nutshell they provide two conditions under which equal respect is 
violated. Under the first rule, it is morally wrong to choose a 
method of administering tax-financed aid that does not show equal 
respect for all. The second parameter claims that it is wrong to 
choose a way of distributing aid in a way that some persons could 
not self-respectfully accept. To use an example, if you and I were 
to start a lawn mowing business and I suggested that, even though 
we put in the same amount of work, I should get all the money, 
then that would not be an arrangement that you could self-
respectfully accept.  
 Miller thus separates respect out into a respect outward and 
respect inward; respect for others and self-respect. Any 
administration of tax financed aid thus has to express and satisfy 
both forms of respect.  
 
Rawlsian Intermezzo 
 At this point I think it will be beneficial to elucidate some 
concepts from John Rawls that are implicit in much of Miller‘s 
further discussion. Although Miller is not defending anything like 
a Rawlsian position, much of political philosophy is steeped in the 
tradition started by Rawls and it is therefore useful to have a basic 
understanding of some of the background concepts informing this 
discussion.  
 Rawls conceives of society as ―a fair system of 
cooperation‖5 among free and equal citizens. Fairness is necessary 
                                                 
5
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 14. 
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for Rawls because one does not choose what society one is born 
into, and exiting a society is extremely difficult if not impossible. 
Society is thus unlike other forms of association such as local 
communities, schools, clubs, church congregations etc. where 
membership can be given up if one is asked to uphold rules and 
practices that one is unwilling to support. Since no such an exit 
option exists for the nation state there is a more urgent demand for 
fairness. 
 Not only is societal membership largely involuntary, it also 
exposes persons to the coercive nature of the state. For Rawls 
―political power is always coercive power applied by the state and 
its apparatus of enforcement.‖ 6 As citizens we participate in the 
creation of laws, which the state then enforces in our name. 
Justification is thus demanded both on the grounds that laws are 
enacted in our name as well as that laws are enforced upon us.  
 Given this nature of society and the demands for 
justification that it gives rise to, Rawls is particularly concerned 
with the well being of what he calls ―the least-advantaged 
members of society.‖7 It is easy to see why this is: given the 
coercive nature of the state and the near impossibility of exiting 
society, it is the worst off group that is most likely to feel trapped 
in a system that they would not voluntarily uphold. This group 
could certainly be coerced into cooperation, but the ideal of a just 
society would then have been forfeited. I take Miller‘s concerns 
about respect to also be focusing largely on this group, and for 
similar reasons. 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 40 
7
 Ibid., 43 
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Loss of Social Trust 
 Returning to Miller‘s argument, he claims that a failure to 
prioritize compatriots would entail a violation of the principle of 
equal respect. This violation comes about in two ways. First, 
without a patriotic bias, tax-financed aid is distributed in a way that 
does not express respect to all. Specifically, the least-advantaged 
members of society are not treated respectfully by their fellow 
citizens. This goes against the first parameter of equal respect that I 
stated above. The idea here seems to be that by not paying extra 
attention to the needs of disadvantaged compatriots we are treating 
them disrespectfully, which the first parameter holds to be wrong.  
 The second way in which a breach of equal respect comes 
about is through the inability of the least-advantaged group in 
society to self-respectfully accept such an allocation of tax-
financed aid. Put differently, the least well off members of society 
could not choose a use of tax-financed aid that did not prioritize 
them and at the same time maintain their self-respect. The sacrifice 
required of them would be too large, the inequalities faced too 
stark. Since an allocation is imposed on them that they could not 
self-respectfully accept, parameter 2 of equal respect is violated 
and the allocation is thus wrong. 
 It is important to note here that the priority that Miller 
requires is a very strong one:  
  
[P]riority does not totally exclude support for 
foreign aid in the presence of relevant domestic 
burdens. Still, until domestic political 
arrangements have done as much as they can [...] 
to eliminate serious burdens of domestic 
inequality of life-prospects, there should be no 
 8 
 
significant sacrifice of this goal in order to help 
disadvantaged foreigners.
8
 
 
To put the consequences of this patriotic bias in context, Miller 
presents us with three persons who present the three main 
stakeholders in the outcome of this discussion. Kevin is a corporate 
lawyer living in a rich suburb of New York. Carla lives in the 
South Bronx and earns a meager living cleaning other people‘s 
apartments. Khalid, finally, collects scrap metal and lives in a slum 
in Dacca, Bangladesh.  Miller maintains that the patriotic bias and 
its consequences can be self-respectfully accepted by all three. As 
we stated above, Carla, as a member of the least-advantaged group 
in society, can self-respectfully accept a situation in which she is 
prioritized to the extent that Miller suggests in the statement above. 
Kevin also upholds the principle of equal respect since he is 
treating Carla in a respectful manner. Khalid, according to Miller, 
can also self-respectfully accept the patriotic bias that Kevin and 
Carla adhere to since he understands that both value the social trust 
that would be lost without such a bias. Kevin and Carla are also 
assumed to be treating Khalid respectfully, although Miller does 
not go into detail as to why that would be the case.  
 Naturally such a bias is a very convenient view for rich 
societies to hold since it reduces their obligations to foreign aid 
significantly. As Thomas Nagel points out in ―The Problem of 
Global Justice‖, however, the fact that a theory is convenient 
doesn‘t make it false.9  
                                                 
8
 Miller, ―Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern‖, 134 
9
 Thomas Nagel, ―The Problem of Global Justice,‖  Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005): 126. 
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 There is, however, another reason to be suspicious about 
Miller‘s patriotic bias as based on the principle of equal respect. 
Note that changes in Khalid‘s level of deprivation do not change 
the bias. Miller chooses to think of him as a scrap metal collector 
in Bangladesh, but we could just as easily imagine him as living in 
a refugee camp in Chad, or working 70 hours a week in a coal 
mine in Brazil, and Miller‘s bias would remain unaffected. Also 
note that Khalid does not feature anywhere in Miller‘s argument 
prior to the establishment of the patriotic bias. The fact that 
Khalid‘s circumstances are not being taken into account at all 
makes it at the very least unlikely that he is being shown equal 
respect.  
 Deciding on the extent of a patriotic bias that is supposed to 
show equal respect to all can hardly be done without looking at the 
needs of foreigners, especially given the severity of global poverty. 
Although the facts of global poverty cannot, in and of themselves, 
decide the debate about patriotic bias, they can help pull it into 
focus. Thomas Pogge estimates that in the 15 years following the 
Cold War, 270 million people died from poverty related causes, an 
average of 18 million a year.
10
 Against the backdrop of these grim 
facts, a theory that does not take into account the needs of the 
global poor can hardly claim to express equal respect for all. 
 In the next section I will present two criticisms of Miller‘s 
argument. The first focuses on a framing issue that I think skews 
the debate and misrepresents the trade-offs involved in reallocation 
                                                 
10
 Pogge, Thomas W. M. ―From A Cosmopolitan Perspective on the Global 
Economic Order.‖ In The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, edited by 
Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, (Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press, 
2005), 92. 
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of tax-financed aid. The second criticism is far more fundamental 
and proves that the   principle of equal respect used by Miller is 
uninformative and stands in need of a better definition. I will 
consequently suggest a more informative definition grounded in 
contemporary political philosophy of human rights. 
 
Framing  
 My claim here is that Miller gets the strong bias that he 
wants by the way he frames the reallocation of tax-financed aid. In 
short, my contention is that Miller implicit assumes the amount of 
tax-financed aid to be fixed, or determined at a point prior to the 
patriotic bias discussion. By doing this, any imagined change to the 
allocation of this aid becomes a zero-sum game between Carla and 
Khalid. The amount of aid is set, so any aid to Khalid will have to 
come out of tax money reserved for Carla. This places undue 
tension on the allocation decision as we are forced to choose 
between two persons clearly in need. Certainly, in absolute terms 
Khalid is worse off than Carla, but on the other hand Carla is 
forced to participate in a society with people like Kevin, which 
raises concerns of fairness domestically. The radically unequal 
income distribution in the United States only further aids Miller‘s 
argument.  
 My point is that this is an incorrect framing of the question. 
If we are really concerned with equal respect for all, we should not 
take tax aid as given, but rather as a function of the needs of Carla 
and Khalid and what is owed to them on account of this respect. If, 
for the sake of argument, we take Kevin as the sole tax payer, then 
the tax rate imposed on him should be set at a level at which both 
Carla and Khalid can self-respectfully accept the amount of aid 
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they receive. Framing the question in this way, I think Miller may 
still be justified in claiming that more is owed to compatriots on 
account of the coercive nature of the state. However, the amount 
owed to Khalid is likely to be much higher than what he has in 
mind. Thinking about the reallocation of aid in this way also makes 
more sense if we view it from Khalid‘s perspective. He is more 
likely to think of himself as being owed some type of aid by Kevin 
rather than by Carla, since Kevin is in a position to improve 
Khalid‘s life significantly, at little cost to himself.  
 This then raises the question of how much domestic and 
foreign aid would be sufficient for the satisfaction of the principle 
of equal respect and whether Kevin could self-respectfully accept 
such a tax burden. This is where the limitations of Miller‘s account 
become clearly visible, because the definition of equal respect that 
he uses is completely uninformative on this matter. It seems to me 
that Khalid could not self-respectfully accept the bias proposed by 
Miller, but how much would foreign aid have to increase for that to 
change? And if we found this amount, how could we tell if the tax 
burden required is one that Kevin could self-respectfully accept?  
 
Equal Respect Revisited 
 The uninformative nature of the equal respect principle 
stems from the fact that Miller defines it in terms of respect. If we 
look again at the two parameters, we notice that they largely 
constitute an elucidation of the concept of equal respect. Miller 
effectively break it down into two components: respect-towards 
and self-respect. Parameters one and two deal with those 
respectively. However, the meaning and import of these 
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components remains unhappily vague as can be seen in the 
discussion at the end of the previous section. 
 I think current thought in political philosophy can provide 
us with more informative concepts of what equal respect entails. 
The one I shall focus on here is the recent work in philosophy of 
human rights, although Amarty Sen and Martha Nussbaum‘s work 
on the human capabilities approach is also a strong candidate.  
 
Human Rights as Equal Respect 
 International human rights practice is commonly seen as 
motivated by the need to protect human dignity in some form or 
other. Although this idea of dignity is rather vague, a clear 
connection can be seen with the idea of respect. What we mean by 
equal respect is that we treat other persons as having a certain 
amount of equal intrinsic value. We regard them as worthy of 
moral consideration.  
 Recent works in the philosophy of human rights have 
expounded this idea of dignity and tried to give it more substance. 
They have established strong philosophical frameworks for 
thinking about the goal and content of human rights. The account 
given by James Nickel in Making Sense of Human Rights focuses 
on vital human interests that human rights are designed to protect. 
As such, human rights can be seen as necessary conditions for 
living a minimally good life. James Griffin‘s account in On Human 
Rights envisions them as protecting a person‘s liberty, autonomy, 
and basic standard of living.
11
 Again, human rights are used to 
protect what we see as central to human life.  
                                                 
11
 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 51. 
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 I think that these accounts can help lend content to the 
concept of equal respect. Since human rights are necessary 
conditions for a minimally good life, violating them can rightly be 
seen as disrespecting the holder of that right. Human rights thus set 
a minimum standard for what equal respect for all persons requires: 
namely a guarantee not to violate human rights and a strong duty to 
help uphold and enforce them whenever one is in a position to do 
so at relatively low cost to oneself. 
 Applying this human rights definition of equal respect to 
Miller‘s account yields a very different outcome. For one, the 
patriotic bias can no longer be established by only considering the 
domestic case. Instead, equal respect demands an effort to 
guarantee the observance of human right for all persons both 
domestically and abroad.  
 Certainly I have only sketched an outline here of what such 
an approach to the allocation of tax-financed aid would entail. 
Further development of the idea of ‗human rights as a standard for 
equal respect‘ is necessary in order to work out its exact practical 
implications.  The duties of different well-off societies to help the 
global poor in having their human rights protected need to be 
coordinated and a reasonable limit needs to be placed on the 
burden that such duties can impose on these societies.  
 Nevertheless, it appears clear from the outset that any 
patriotic bias that claims to show equal respect on my definition of 
that term, would be quite different from the one argued for by 
Miller. It almost certainly calls for a greater transfer of aid from 
the per-capita rich countries to those in need. It does not preclude 
the existence of a patriotic bias in tax-financed aid, and in fact 
arguments for such a bias are probably justified. It does mean that 
 14 
 
demands for equal respect will take precedence over any 
considerations of patriotic priority, as I have argued they should.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper I have shown that Richard Miller‘s argument 
for a patriotic bias rests on an uninformative definition of the 
principle of equal respect. Due to the indeterminate nature of this 
principle, it is unclear what sort of patriotic bias can be justified. 
Whether different allocations of tax-financed aid show equal 
respect for all becomes a matter of speculation and personal 
interpretations of human psychology.  
 I have argued that the philosophical human rights tradition 
can provide us with a more substantial account of what respect for 
persons entails. Recent influential works by James Nickel and 
James Griffin suggest human rights as a protection of abilities and 
interests necessary for living a minimally good life. Given the 
important nature of human rights to individuals persons, I suggest 
that equal respect entails the non-violation of these rights as well 
as a duty to protect and uphold them when one can do so at little 
cost to oneself. I note that this is merely the first step in the 
creation of such an account and that more work is needed to 
establish clearly the demands ‗human rights as a standard for equal 
respect‘ can and ought to give rise to. I do contend that any 
account based on this new definition of human rights will fail to 
establish a patriotic bias as strong as the one argued for by Richard 
Miller. 
 A last remark with regard to the question of tax-financed 
aid is in order. As Charles Beitz has noted, discussions in the field 
of global economic justice often make too much of the importance 
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of transfer payments from tax dollars.
12
 More effective, efficient 
and lasting solutions to problems of economic inequality and 
global poverty can likely be found through the structural 
rearrangement of institutions such that they favor - or at the very 
least cease to actively disadvantage - the global poor. For the 
purpose of this paper, which was a response to Miller‘s patriotic 
bias in tax-financed aid, such questions of institutional reform were 
unfortunately not within our scope. Discussions in the field of 
global justice and cosmopolitanism can perhaps shine a light on 
fruitful solutions in that direction. 
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 Charles Beitz, ―Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice,‖ The Journal of Ethics 9, 
no. 2 (2005) 
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